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The principle of legal certainty is a fundamental principle of law. Citizens, taxpayers, should 
in general be allowed to rely on the legislation in force to plan their conduct and trans-
actions. The government, including the legislator, should respect the principle of legal 
certainty. However, it is beyond discussion that the legislator should be able to change its 
legislation, including tax legislation. There are various justified reasons to change tax legis-
lation, such as a change of tax policy and social and technical developments. A change in 
legislation could, however, infringe taxpayers’ expectations raised by the existing legisla-
tion. This could especially be the case if the legislator decides that the amended legislation 
is applicable to past tax periods (the change has ‘retroactive effect’). But also if the amended 
legislation has ‘immediate effect’ and therefore only applies to future taxable events or tax 
periods, taxpayers’ expectations could be at stake. This would be the case if the legislator 
does not provide for grandfathering. Then, the changed legislation also applies to future 
effects of a situation that arose under the old legislation (the change has ‘retrospective 
effect’). 
The above in a nutshell is the problem which the tax legislator has to deal with when 
changing legislation. How should the tax legislator act, taking into account the colliding 
interests? Which method should the legislature apply in determining to what extent retro-
activity and retrospectivity are acceptable when enacting tax legislation? In my PhD disser-
tation I dealt with this issue and I developed a framework for the tax legislator grounded on 
a principle-based approach.1 This contribution presents the main lines and results of my 
research. It should be noted that this contribution only deals with retroactive and retrospec-
tive substantive tax legislation that is disadvantageous for taxpayers. Thus, issues like advan-
tageous retroactivity and retrospectivity, procedural tax legislation and retroactivity of case 
law are not specifically addressed. 
Lastly, for various reasons, the contribution does not deal with limits in the Constitu-
tion to transitional law, and thus not with such limits to retroactivity. First of all, countries 
have different constitutional limits (including no limits to the sovereignty of the legislator 
1.	 M.R.T.	Pauwels,	Terugwerkende	kracht	van	belastingwetgeving:	gewikt	en	gewogen	(Retroactivity	of	tax	legislation:	
weighing	and	balancing)	(Amersfoort:	Sdu	Uitgevers,	2009).
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in this respect), while this contribution seeks to offer a general approach to deal with transi-
tional law. Notwithstanding this, the framework I advocate in this contribution can be com-
bined with constitutional limits. Secondly, even if there are constitutional limits, these 
limits usually leave room for the legislator. In general, within the constitutional boundaries, 
the legislator should in my view aim to make the most optimal law, thereby including the 
most optimal transitional law. In terms of the legal theorist Lon Fuller: there is not only a 
moralitiy of duty but also a morality of aspiration.2 Therefore, a framework offers the legislator 
useful guidance.
2.2.2. Overview
This contribution deals in particular with two theoretical issues in the field of transitional 
law that are of special interest. The first concerns the two principles of transitional law that 
are generally accepted. These principles are (i) that a change in legislation should not have 
retroactive effect and (ii) that a change in legislation has immediate effect, without grandfa-
thering, which implies that the legislation could be ‘retrospective’. As I discuss below (sec-
tion 2.2.4), from a legal certainty point of view, the distinction between retroactive effect 
and immediate effect (which could imply a ‘retrospective effect’) is not strict, but only grad-
ual. Taking this point into account, the question arises what the justification is of the 
above-mentioned principles of transitional law that are generally accepted. This is the first 
main issue I address in this contribution.
The second main issue relates to a related subject. It is generally accepted that under 
certain circumstances the legislator is allowed, or even should, deviate from the above-men-
tioned principles of transitional law. The concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has a key role 
in this respect. On the one hand, if no legitimate expectations are infringed, retroactivity 
may be permissible. On the other hand, if the immediate effect (retrospectivity) would 
infringe legitimate expectations, the legislator should provide for grandfathering or 
another transitional provision. However, the question is when expectations can be charac-
terized as ‘legitimate’ and how this should be assessed. This is the second main issue I scruti-
nize in this contribution.
The discussion of these two issues makes up the core of this contribution. However, 
before these issues can be dealt with, it is necessary to outline in brief which theory of law I 
use as the theoretical framework. Subsequently I deal with the principle of legal certainty. I 
then go on to analyse the two main subjects.
2.2.3. Theoretical framework: a principle-based approach3
2.2.3.1. Introduction
The answer to the question which method the legislature ought to apply in determining to 
what extent retroactivity and retrospectivity is acceptable when enacting tax legislation 
depends on the legal theory that is adopted. A law and economics view will provide a differ-
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economics scholars strongly emphasize the objective of an increase in prosperity (utilitari-
anism) and seem not to attach independent value to legal certainty.5 In the more traditional 
legal view – called the ‘old view’ by law and economics scholars6 – legal certainty has an 
independent value, being a key value of law. This difference already provides an indication 
that the evaluation of retroactivity and retrospectivity will differ. 
This contribution takes, for empirical as well as normative reasons, the traditional 
legal view. I do not elaborate on these reasons in this contribution,7 but in essence the rea-
sons are that (empirically:) the practice of law (legislation, case law, an important part of 
the legal literature) shows that legal certainty is considered a key value of law and that 
( normatively:) law and the legal system should aspire to the enhancement of legal certainty, 
since legitimate law without legal certainty is hardly conceivable (compare Fuller’s idea of 
the morality of law, to be discussed in section 2.2.4.2). 
Furthermore, I note with respect to the law and economics view and its apparent 
undervaluation of the value of legal certainty that, interestingly, some economists do criti-
cize the traditional economic standards of measurement. For example, in his recent book, 
the famous economist Stiglitz – winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics – argues that 
the traditional measurement in GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is not adequate, for it fails to 
take into account values that are important for social welfare. In this respect, Stiglitz explic-
itly refers to the values of security and certainty.8 Moreover, continuously in this book, Sti-
glitz criticizes assumptions on which the neo-capitalist theory (‘market fundamentalism’) is 
based, especially the theory of rational markets, of which one element is the assumption 
that people behave rationally. The latter idea is interesting with respect to the law and eco-
nomics view on transitional law, since this view is, amongst other things, based on the – thus 
criticized – assumption that people have rational expectations.9
Notwithstanding the above, in my view, the law and economics literature on transi-
tional law offers valuable insights in addition to insights of the more traditional legal litera-
ture on transitional law. I use these added value elements to improve the traditional legal 
theory on transitional law.
2.2.3.2. From Radbruch to Dworkin and Alexy
The starting point for the development of my theoretical framework is Radbruch’s abstract 
legal theory. In short, his theory is that law ought to be directed towards the realization of 
the idea of law, that is Gerechtigkeit, and that three elements, values, can be discerned there-
in.10 These values are equality (Gleichheit), purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), and legal cer-
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ought to be made absolute.11 ‘Die Drei Bestandteile der Rechtsidee fordern einander – aber 
sie widersprechen zugleich einander.’12 Here, on this abstract level, a difference from the 
approach of law and economics becomes clear. As the latter approach emphasizes the pur-
pose of increase in prosperity, this approach can be seen as a theory in which the realization 
of the value of purposiveness takes priority over realization of the value of legal certainty. 
Such an a priori ranking between values does not exist in Radbruch’s approach.
Radbruch’s theory of law can be elaborated at a less abstract level by following Dwor-
kin’s theory.13 Dworkin considers law to be not a ‘bunch of rules’, but the integrity of rules 
and principles. Dworkin describes a legal principle as ‘a standard to be observed, not 
because it will advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desira-
ble, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morali-
ty.’14 Also Alexy emphasizes the normative value of legal principles. He describes legal prin-
ciples as ‘optimization commands’; they are ‘norms commanding that something be real-
ized to the highest degree that is actually and legally possible.’15 Legal principles are not 
purely moral principles; they are standards which are specific for the law.16 Since fundamen-
tal legal principles constitute the legal expressions of the basic values of a society, lawmak-
ing should conform to legal principles. The body of laws – statute law, case law, and the 
decisions and regulations of the administration – should be ‘consistent in principle.’17 
An important feature of a principle of law is its argumentative character and its 
dimension of weight.18 A principle of law does not dictate a decision or outcome but pro-
vides an argument pointing in a certain direction. If there is a principle that provides an 
argument in another direction in the case concerned, the competing principles ought to be 
balanced.
The process of balancing of principles is an argumentative process; the relative 
weight of the arguments should be assessed in order to assess which principle gets priority 
in the case at hand. In this respect Alexy’s law of balancing is relevant: ‘The greater the 
degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right or principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other’.19 Notwithstanding that this law of balancing is a helpful 
conceptual guideline, in my opinion it cannot always be fully justified as to why one result 
of balancing is better than the other. This phenomenon is connected with the issue of 
incommensurability of principles. For example, if the principle of legal certainty and the 
principle of equality collide in a certain case and the judge (or the legislator) rules that the 
first principle supersedes the second principle in the case at hand, it is not always possible 
to fully justify in rational terms why the principle of legal certainty wins in that case. Often, 
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measurement for weighing principles – principles are incommensurable.21 Nevertheless, it 
can be demanded of the authority (the legislator, the judge, etc.) who balances principles 
that he or it be consistent in that activity.22 Thus, the results of balancing in comparable 
situations should be the same, or at least should not deviate without justification.
2.2.3.3. The case of retroactivity and retrospectivity: a balancing act
What is the meaning of the above for the subject at hand? First of all, a main implication is 
that the government is bound by principles of law. After all, principles are ‘standards to be 
observed’ (Dworkin); they are optimization commands (Alexy). This also applies to the 
legislature when it comes to lawmaking, including the making of transitional law. Secondly, 
principles are not absolute. Hence, notwithstanding that the principle of legal certainty, 
including the principle of honouring legitimate expectations, provides strong arguments 
contra retroactivity, this does not imply that there is an absolute ban on retroactivity. In a 
certain case, certain interests could be served if the legislator were to grant retroactive effect 
to legislation. In that case the competing interests and principles should be weighed. The 
same applies mutatis mutandis for the subject of retrospectivity. Thus, the case of retroactiv-
ity and retrospectivity is a balancing act for the legislator. Thirdly, it should be accepted that 
the result of the balancing cannot always be fully accounted for. This relates to the issue of 
incommensurability of principles. Nevertheless, the demand for consistency of the legisla-
tor when balancing implies that if legislative situations are comparable23 the transitional 
law should in principle be comparable.
2.2.4. Retroactivity and retrospectivity in view of legal certainty
2.2.4.1. Introduction
Legal certainty has a two-fold value, one is intrinsic, the other instrumental.24 Legal certain-
ty’s intrinsic value regards the notion of personal freedom. First and foremost, this concerns 
the liberty to do and not do as one pleases. This is often called ‘negative liberty’, the liberty 
to choose between alternative courses of action without interference by others.25 People 
want to be sure about the legal consequences of their dealings. In tax law this certainty 
regards the ‘reach’ of tax law and the inroad upon taxpayer’s economic freedom, i.e. his tax 
burden. 
Secondly, legal certainty has an instrumental aspect. Tax legislation is not only a con-
straint, but may also be an opportunity for taxpayers. Nowadays, the use of tax legislation 
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tor seduces taxpayers to behave according to his ends.26 Consequently, Netherlands tax law 
contains all kinds of instrumentalist incentives mostly in the form of tax reductions. 
Both the intrinsic and the instrumental values imply that certainty about the law 
enables people to make rational choices and to plan their activities at large. Thus, it is clear 
why legal certainty is important and what it should enable, but what does ‘legal certainty’ 
actually involve?
2.2.4.2. The concept of legal certainty: an aspects concept
The concept of legal certainty is not an easy one. Tridimas is right when he states: ‘Legal 
certainty is by its nature diffuse, perhaps more so than any other general principle, and its 
precise content is difficult to pin down.’27 As soon as one tries to make the concept concrete 
or describe what ‘legal certainty’ involves, one easily starts to sum up requirements: the law 
should be published, it should be clear, etc. In my view, the concept of legal certainty should 
be regarded as an ‘aspects concept’: a concept that consists of various aspects.28
Here, the well-known desiderata formulated by Lon Fuller for the sake of the ‘inner 
morality of law’ spring to mind.29 Although Fuller deals with the desiderata in the light of 
the principle of legality, they are all also aspects of legal certainty.30 These desiderata consti-
tute the ‘internal morality of law’, the morality that makes law possible. Fuller’s desiderata 
are nowadays still important. Fuller’s theory is often used as a starting point for further 
elaboration, discussion and refinement of the principle of legal certainty.31
First, Fuller mentions the generality of law, i.e., ‘there must be rules.’ General rules 
promote legal certainty. In a state under the rule of law it is hardly possible to control and 
direct human conduct without rules applying to general classes of people. A second 
demand is the promulgation of laws. Legal rules ought to be published. Citizens are entitled 
to know the law in advance, which enables them to predict the legal consequences of their 
behaviour and it also allows for public criticism. Thirdly, Fuller criticizes retroactivity: in 
itself ‘a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity’. Note, however, that also in Fuller’s view there 
is no absolute ban on retroactivity. According to Fuller, situations may arise in which grant-
ing retroactive effect to legal rules, ‘not only becomes tolerable, but may actually be essen-
tial to advance the cause of legality.’ Fourth, Fuller argues that the clarity of laws is essential 
to control and direct human conduct. A fifth desideratum is rather obvious: rules must not 
require contradictory actions. A further desideratum is that laws should not require the 
impossible. A last requirement which regards the law itself holds that laws should not be 
changed too frequently. Frequent changes make it harder for people to gear their activities 
to the law. This demand for the constancy of the law directly serves the predictability of 
legislation and the legislator’s reliability. As Fuller points out, there is a close affinity 
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tive legislation. Both are caused by legislative inconstancy. The last demand of Fuller is for 
congruence between the declared rules and the acts of the administration. This aspect 
regards the application of legislation, not – as the other desiderata do – the quality of legisla-
tion itself. 
In addition to Fuller’s desiderata, the principle of honouring legitimate expectations 
raised by the law could be addressed as an aspect of legal certainty. This principle is implic-
itly covered by some of the desiderata, such as the standard of non-retroactivity, the 
demand that the laws should not be changed too frequently, and the requirement of con-
gruence between the declared rules and the acts of the administration. However, the princi-
ple of honouring legitimate expectations raised by the law deserves explicit acknowledg-
ment as an aspect of legal certainty.
2.2.4.3. Retroactivity in view of legal certainty
As mentioned above, the demand of non-retroactivity is an aspect of legal certainty. The 
principle of non-retroactivity has in my opinion a very solid basis in the principle of legal 
certainty. Even if the principle of non-retroactivity were not to be explicitly distinguished 
and characterized as an aspect of legal certainty, the other aspects of legal certainty would 
entail that laws should as a matter of principle not be retroactive. 
First of all, the other desiderata of Fuller would imply that laws should not be retroac-
tive. In essence, these desiderata serve the aim that the law is knowable. Knowable law 
enables citizens to predict the legal consequences of their actions and therefore to plan 
their conduct and actions. It is clear that a retroactive law is inherently not capable of doing 
that. After all, a citizen cannot predict the legal consequences of an action on the basis of 
the law that only enters into force after the action occurred.
Secondly, a retroactive law is not only incapable of enabling citizens to predict the 
legal consequences of their actions. A retroactive law also infringes the expectations that 
were raised by the former law, i.e. the law that was applicable at the moment the action was 
executed. A citizen expected – based on the then applicable law A – that his action would 
have legal consequence ‘a’, but at the end the legal consequences appear to be ‘b’, based on 
the retroactive law B.
2.2.4.4. Immediate effect without grandfathering (retrospectivity) in view of legal 
certainty
How should a law be assessed from the viewpoint of legal certainty if that law is granted 
immediate effect, without grandfathering? This immediate effect, without grandfathering, 
entails that the new law applies to all events that occur after the entering into force of the 
law, including the events that have their origin in actions prior to that moment. For exam-
ple, suppose that a new tax rule is introduced to the effect that mortgage interest is not 
deductible for income tax purposes, while under the old tax rule the mortgage interest was 
tax deductible. Suppose further that the legislator grants immediate effect to that new rule 
and that he does not provide for grandfathering of existing mortgage loans. Then, the new 
rule is applicable to all mortgage interest that is paid after the date of entry into force, so 
also to interest paid on mortgage loans that were concluded prior to that date. The term 
‘retrospective’ is used for this phenomenon.
If the above analysis with respect to retroactivity is applied to retrospectivity, it 
appears that the same issues arise. First of all, the ‘knowability’ and predictability of the law 
are at stake in the sense that a part of the legal consequences of an action are governed by a 
law that was not yet in force at the moment of that action and which the citizen could there-
fore not take into consideration when planning that action. I refer in this respect also to the 
EATLP Leuven 2010 Congress
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above-mentioned remark by Fuller on the close affinity between the demand for the con-
stancy and the demand of non-retroactivity. 
Secondly, the new law infringes the expectations which the citizen had based on the 
law that applied when the action was carried out. The citizen expected that mortgage inter-
est would be deductible when he concluded the mortgage loan agreement, but that expec-
tation is not honoured.
Thus, the principle of legal certainty offers arguments contra retrospectivity. In posi-
tive terms: the principle of legal certainty offers arguments pro grandfathering.
2.2.4.5. The difference between retroactivity and retrospectivity: only gradual
The above analysis shows that the arguments contra retroactivity are also arguments contra 
immediate effect without grandfathering (retrospectivity). It can be concluded that the 
distinction between retroactivity, on the one hand, and immediate effect without grandfa-
thering (retrospectivity), on the other hand, loses relevance from the perspective of legal 
certainty. There is no strict distinction but only a gradual distinction. This is nowadays gen-
erally accepted in the legal literature.32
I note that the conclusion that the difference between retroactivity and immediate 
effect without grandfathering is only gradual is also supported – even strongly – in law and 
economics literature on transitional law, which looks at the impact of both.33 For example, 
Graetz concludes that ‘the distinctions commonly drawn between retroactive and prospec-
tive effective dates are illusory.’34
2.2.5. Principles of transitional law: priority principles
2.2.5.1. Introduction: research question
There are two principles of transitional law that are generally accepted. As far as I am aware, 
these principles are accepted by the legislator, by the court when it judges the legislator’s 
transitional law, as well as in the literature. The first principle is that a change in legislation 
has immediate effect, without grandfathering. Hence, retrospectivity of legislation is gener-
ally accepted. The second principle of transitional law is that that a change in legislation 
should, as a matter of principle, not have retroactive effect. 
These principles of transitional law thus involve a relatively sharp distinction 
between retroactive effect (in principle not permissible) and immediate effect (in principle 

















Pauwels Part 2.  2.2. Retroactive and retrospective tax legislation – 2.2.5.2. 
of legal certainty and from a law and economics perspective, the difference between a 
change with retroactive effect and a change with immediate effect is only gradual. The ques-
tion therefore arises what the justification is of the above-mentioned principles of transi-
tional law. This section deals with this question.
2.2.5.2. Framework for transitional law: principle of legal certainty, the objective of 
the law, and principle of equality
In my view, the issue of principles of transitional law in tax law should be understood from 
an abstract framework that is formed by three major principles or, as the case may be, inter-
ests. For this triad of interests I am inspired by the above-mentioned theory of Radbruch.
The first principle has already been discussed above. It is the principle of legal cer-
tainty. Looked at from the point of view of legal certainty, a law should not only have no 
retroactive effect, but should also have no immediate effect without grandfathering. The 
principle of legal certainty advocates providing for grandfathering to avoid retrospectivity.
However, if the legislator provides for grandfathering, the new law does not become 
effective with respect to the cases that are grandfathered. Thus, the objective that is served 
by the new law cannot be reached to the extent that grandfathering is provided. Suppose a 
new law is introduced that involves extra taxes on flights by airplanes and that this law has 
an environmental objective. It is obvious that if existing airplanes were grandfathered, this 
would not serve that environmental objective. The environmental objective would be better 
served if the new law were to apply to all flights, including flights by existing airplanes. The 
second interest is therefore ‘the objective of the law’. In particular, the law and economics 
literature – in my view: correctly – emphasizes that grandfathering has social costs as it 
entails delay and reduction of the benefits of the new law.35
So from the perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ a new law should have immediate 
effect without grandfathering. The objective of the law involves an argument contra grand-
fathering and pro retrospectivity. 
With respect to the issue of retroactivity, the perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ 
does not provide an argument pro retroactivity. After all, as discussed above (sec-
tion 2.2.4.3), a retroactive law itself is not able to guide behaviour.36 Nonetheless, in certain 
situations, ‘the objective of the law’ could advocate retroactivity. An example is the situation 
in which a loophole exists in a law. If a new law is introduced to cure this loophole, the 
‘objective of the law’ provides an argument pro retroactivity of that law. After all, to the 
extent taxpayers exploit the loophole, the original law fails to meet its own objective.
The third principle is the principle of equality. For the viewpoint of the principle of 
equality on transitional law, I consider to be equal those facts that ratione materiae fall 
within the scope of the new law and that occur in the same period. This definition taken into 
account, the principle of equality advocates against grandfathering. The reason is that 
grandfathering leads to unequal treatment of facts that fall within the scope of the new law 
and which occur in the same period. After all, in the case of grandfathering, the new law 
does not apply to certain facts that occur after the entry into force and that would ratione 
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of existing airplanes would imply that flights by new airplanes are taxed higher than flights 
by existing airplanes in the same period. It should be emphasized that this does not imply 
that the principle of equality requires that there should never be grandfathering. My reason-
ing is only that the principle of equality provides an argument contra grandfathering as well 
as that, from the perspective of the principle of equality, grandfathering needs a justifica-
tion. 
From the above-mentioned viewpoint of the principle of equality on transitional law, 
the principle of equality does not provide an argument pro or contra retroactivity. Based on 
another viewpoint, it could however be argued that the principle of equality may provide an 
argument against retroactivity. The basic idea is then that retroactivity implies that unequal 
cases are treated equally, as all facts that arose prior to the promulgation of the new law are 
treated as equal to facts arisen after the promulgation. However, in my view, this argument is 
in essence strongly interrelated with the argument of legal certainty. After all, the reason for 
considering these facts as unequal is that in the former case the law was not yet in force when 
the facts arose, while in the latter case the law is in force when the facts arise.
It should be noted that in a concrete legislative case of transitional law other princi-
ples or interests could also be involved in addition to the three just discussed. Such other 
principles are for example the principle of legality, the principle of equality of arms (which 
could be infringed if a retroactive law influences pending proceedings for the judiciary) and 
the ability-to-pay-principle. Nonetheless, these principles and interests are in my view the 
most important, as they are involved in almost all legislative cases of transitional law. This 
does not imply that other principles are not relevant. After all, these principles should 
indeed be taken into account in the balancing process insofar they are involved in the legis-
lative case at hand.
With respect to the issue of retroactivity, the above shows that (i) the principle of 
legal certainty provides strong arguments contra retroactivity, (ii) the principle of equality 
does not provide an (additional) argument pro or contra retroactivity and (iii) from the 
perspective of ‘the objective of the law’ there may be an argument pro retroactivity in cer-
tain situations.
With respect to the issue of immediate effect without grandfathering, the conclusion 
is that (i) the principle of legal certainty advocates grandfathering, (ii) the principle of 
equality provides an argument contra grandfathering and (iii) from the perspective of ‘the 
objective of the law’ there should be no grandfathering.
2.2.5.3. The principles of transitional law should be conceptualized as ‘priority 
principles’
On the basis of the above, a theoretical foundation can be given for the generally accepted 
principles of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering 
and the principle of no retroactivity. In my view, these principles of transitional law should 
be conceptualized as – what I call – ‘priority principles’. 
The ‘priority’ element relates to the idea that the principles of transitional law should 
be regarded as the result of a process of balancing which results in the priority of one inter-
est or principle over the other. As the analysis in the previous section shows, the three prin-
ciples and interests involved provide arguments in different directions with respect to an 
adequate transitional law. Hence, a balancing of these principles or interests is necessary.
The principle of non-retroactivity is the result of the balancing of these principles and 
interests in the sense that the principle of legal certainty – that provides an argument contra 
retroactivity – prevails and has priority over any other interests. As to the principle of 
 immediate effect without grandfathering, the objective of the law and the principle of 
equality – which provide arguments against grandfathering – outweigh the principle of 
legal certainty – which advocates grandfathering.
105
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The ‘principle’ element of ‘priority principles’ refers to the fact the two results of balancing 
the three principles and interests are only prima facie results. The results – immediate effect 
without grandfathering and no retroactivity – are not rules: they do not dictate – as rules do 
– but indicate a direction, as principles do. The results should therefore not be characterized 
as priority rules but as priority principles. The balancing results are the results of an abstract 
balancing of the three principles or interests. In a concrete legislative case of transitional 
law, the results of balancing may differ. On the one hand, due to the circumstances of the 
case, one or more of the three principles or interests could have more or less weight than 
the weight taken into account in the abstract balancing. On the other hand, in a concrete 
legislative case, there could also be other principles or interests involved that should be 
taken into account when balancing and making transitional law.
Finally, it should be noted that the above provides a theoretical foundation for the 
generally accepted principles of transitional law. Based on the framework that is constituted 
by the principle of legal certainty, ‘the objective of the law’, and the principle of equality, the 
principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity 
can be justified in terms of balancing results. It is, however, not possible to fully substantiate 
why these are the abstract balancing results and why for example grandfathering for one 
year is not a more optimal balancing result. This relates to the more general issue of incom-
mensurability of principles, referred to in section 2.2.3.2.
2.2.6. Legitimate expectations? An approach based on ‘the method of the 
catalogue of circumstances’
2.2.6.1. Introduction: the problem and research question
The legislator can rely on two principles of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate 
effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity. The above confirms 
that these principles are indeed principles and not rules. Therefore, in a concrete legislative 
case, there could be reasons for the legislator to deviate from these principles. 
To answer the question as to whether in a concrete case there is reason to deviate from 
the principles of transitional law, the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ has an important 
role. If taxpayers are deemed not to have legitimate expectations in the legislative case at hand, 
the principle of legal certainty has less weight and there may thus be reason to grant retroac-
tive effect. The other way around, if immediate effect without grandfathering were to infringe 
upon legitimate expectations of taxpayers in the legislative case at hand, the principle of legal 
certainty has more weight and there is more reason to provide for grandfathering. Accord-
ingly, the question as to whether or not taxpayers have ‘legitimate expectations’ plays an 
important role when the principles of transitional law are applied. 
However, the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is generally problematic. In the first 
place, the term ‘legitimate expectations’ is often used to indicate that expectations are at 
stake that partially or completely should be honoured. If used in this way, an important step 
has already been passed. This is the step in which the principle of honouring legitimate 
expectations is balanced against any interests that advocate contra honouring the expecta-
tions (‘counter-interests’). The adjective ‘legitimate’ then points in particular to the final 
result, and is useless for the answer to the question as to under which circumstances expec-
tations should be honoured. In the second place: even if the term ‘legitimate expectations’ is 
only used for stating that it concerns expectations that are reasonable and could qualify to 
be honoured, the term remains a vague one. For when are expectations ‘legitimate’? The 
latter question is the research question I deal with in this section. Though the usage does 
not have my preference I avoid confusion by following the usual legal terminology indi-
cated above with regard to the term ‘legitimate expectations’. Hence, ‘legitimate expecta-
tions’ are expectations that should be honoured.
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2.2.6.2. An initial theoretical framework to approach the concept ‘legitimate 
expectations’
The above indicates that the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is vague and somewhat 
problematic. The question is whether it is possible to provide some support to the legislator 
for assessing when the expectations at hand can be characterized as ‘legitimate’. In this 
section an initial theoretical framework to approach the concept ‘legitimate expectations’ is 
developed. 
In my view, conceptually, two steps can be discerned when it comes to the assessment 
of whether in a concrete case expectations are ‘legitimate’. The first step concerns the ques-
tion as to whether the subjective expectations in the case at hand are reasonable. If the 
answer is affirmative, the second step is to answer the question whether the reasonable 
expectations are legitimate expectations. If the answer to the latter question is also affirma-
tive, the expectations should be honoured.
Sometimes, there is still a third step. That step concerns the question to what extent 
expectations ought to be honoured. The conclusion that the expectations at hand are legiti-
mate does not automatically mean that the expectations ought to be fully honoured. For 
example, if the existence of legitimate expectations entails that the legislator should pro-
vide for grandfathering, this does not necessarily imply that the grandfathering should be 
unlimited in time. Grandfathering for a couple of years could be more appropriate.
The first step – from subjective expectations to reasonable expectations – concerns a 
process of filtering by objectification. The process of objectification takes place by taking 
the view of a reasonable person.37 The second step concerns a balancing of the expectations 
with the ‘counter-interests’ (the interest that would be infringed if the expectations were to 
be honoured). The factors that are significant for the first step are also significant for the 
balancing involved in the second step. They are of influence for answering the question how 
important it is that the expectations are honoured. Thus, notwithstanding that the two 
steps can conceptually be distinguished, in practice the two steps are actually hard to dis-
cern. The third step is interrelated with the second step. After all, the question to what 
extent expectations ought to be honoured also concerns a process of balancing with 
‘ counter-interests’.
This framework gives the legislator something to hold on to, but it has its limits. For 
example, the idea of objectification is helpful, but the question as to whether expectations 
are reasonable cannot be answered without information about the circumstances of the 
case. Further, the question as to whether expectations are legitimate cannot be considered 
apart from the weight of the ‘counter-interests’. Which counter-interests are involved and 
the weight of these counter-interests also depends on the circumstances of the case. The 
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ therefore remains a concept that is difficult to grasp in 
abstracto. Ultimately, the circumstances of the case are decisive.
However, is it possible to offer the legislator more than the answer ‘that depends 
upon the circumstances of the case’ with respect to his assessment of the legitimacy of 
expectations? To answer this question, in the next section, the Netherlands case law with 
respect to the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as a general principle of 
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2.2.6.3. Method of priority rules?
Obviously, the question how to approach the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is relevant 
in more areas than the field of transitional law only. For example, in the doctrine of the 
principle of honouring legitimate expectations as a general principle of proper administra-
tion in tax law, the judiciary has also to deal with the concept ‘legitimate expectations’. Also 
in that field the question is when expectations should be honoured. It concerns the issue in 
which circumstances the principle of honouring of legitimate expectations justifies a devia-
tion from the strict application of the legislation. In terms of balancing principles, it con-
cerns balancing the principle of legality and the principle of honouring of legitimate expec-
tations. Interestingly for this subject, the Netherlands Supreme Court has succeeded in 
developing a certain method that offers clear guidelines. This method is the method of 
‘priority rules’.38 The question arises whether this method could be useful to approach the 
concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the field of transitional law.
The Supreme Court has distinguished several particular types of situations (‘standard 
situations’) in which the tax administration could cause taxpayers to develop expectations. 
The distinction is based on the origin of the expectations. Such standard situations are 
amongst other ones expectations raised by a policy rule of the tax administration, expecta-
tions raised by a promise of the tax inspector, and expectations raised by general informa-
tion of the tax administration. For each of the standard situations, the Supreme Court has 
developed rules for the balancing of principles, resulting in ‘priority rules’. Such a priority 
rule indicates under which circumstances the principle of honouring of legitimate expecta-
tions outweighs – and therefore gets priority above – the principle of legality. 
To illustrate this, I refer to the priority rule for promises. This priority rule prescribes 
that the expectations raised by a promise are honoured (which thus implies an application 
that deviates from the legislation) in case (i) the taxpayer has the impression that the tax 
inspector takes a certain position concerning his application of the tax law, (ii) the taxpayer 
has told the tax inspector all relevant facts and circumstances of his case, (iii) the taxpayer 
may reasonably think the promise is in the spirit of the law, and (iv) the tax inspector is 
competent to deal with the taxpayer.
A characteristic of a priority rule is that it has the same structure as a statutory provi-
sion. Just like a statutory provision, a priority rule sets out criteria. In a concrete case, it 
should be verified whether all the criteria are met. If the criteria are all met, the rule applies. 
In that case the expectations concerned are considered legitimate and are honoured. In 
other words, the principle of honouring legitimate expectations then has priority above the 
principle of legality. If one of the criteria is not met in the case at hand, the priority rule is 
not applied. In that case, the principle of legality gets priority and the expectations are not 
honoured.
From the perspective of the question how to approach the concept of legitimate 
expectations, it is interesting to note that, first of all, a priority rule, in particular its criteria, 
provides a selection of the circumstances that are relevant for the standard situation con-
cerned. The judiciary only has to investigate whether these circumstances are present in the 
case at hand. The judiciary does not to need to examine the presence of other circumstances. 
Secondly, a priority rule in fact determines which circumstances on their own are a necessary 
condition to assume ‘legitimate expectations’. If one of the circumstances included in the 
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expectations at hand are not honoured. Thirdly, a priority rule determines which circum-
stances together are a sufficient condition to assume ‘legitimate expectations’. If all circum-
stances that are included in the priority rule are present in the case at hand, the expecta-
tions are considered legitimate and are honoured. Thus, other circumstances are not rele-
vant.
The above shows that the method of priority rules has important benefits. Notwith-
standing these benefits, in my opinion, the method of priority rules is not suitable as gen-
eral method in the field of transitional tax law. It may be possible to provide a priority rule 
for one or more specific types of situation. But as a general method, it is in my opinion too 
rigid in the field of transitional tax law. The situations that may arise are too varied to cover 
the whole field with priority rules. More flexibility is needed. This is, amongst other things, 
caused by the fact that in the field of transitional law the ‘counter-interests’ vary in number 
and weight depending on the circumstances of the case. 
2.2.6.4. Method of the catalogue of circumstances
In the previous section I discussed the method of rules of priority to approach the concept 
of ‘legitimate expectations’. I concluded that this method has important benefits, but that it 
is not suitable as a general method in the field of transitional law. This does not mean, how-
ever, that as to the question when expectations may be called legitimate, we are completely 
thrown back on the ‘open’ answer ‘that depends upon the circumstances of the case’.
An appropriate method for approaching the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ in 
the field of transitional law, in my opinion, is the method of the catalogue of circumstances. 
This method takes an intermediate position between only a non-specified reference to the 
circumstances of the case (an ‘open group of circumstances’), on the one hand, and the 
method of priority rules, on the other hand. In the context of making transitional law, the 
method of the catalogue of circumstances means that the legislature ought to assess 
whether the circumstances listed in the catalogue are present in the legislative case at hand 
and that it must take these circumstances into consideration when balancing the various 
principles and interests involved. An open catalogue of circumstances is preferable to an 
exhaustive one because it cannot be ruled out that in a concrete case of law-making a spe-
cial circumstance is present that also deserves to be taken into consideration but that is not 
included in the catalogue. 
A difference from, and an advantage in comparison to, an ‘open group of circum-
stances’ is that the method of the catalogue of circumstances determines which circum-
stances ought to be taken into consideration (as far as they are present in the legislative case 
at hand). The method has this feature in common with the method of priority rules. A differ-
ence with that latter method is, however, that it still leaves open what the impact is of the 
circumstances. Other than in the method of priority rules, neither which circumstances are 
necessary conditions nor which circumstances together are a sufficient condition for expecta-
tions to be honoured has been determined. This is also caused by the fact that the weight of 
the ‘counter-interests’ is unknown. 
An advantage of the method of the catalogue of circumstances is that it provides the 
legislator a foothold for balancing, because it is clear which circumstances the legislator in 
any case should take into account when balancing the colliding interests. The method also 
has the advantage that, to a certain extent, it urges the authority who submits a bill to par-
liament to provide reasons for his proposal with respect to the transitional law that is pro-
posed in the bill. This may contribute to the transparency of the legislative proposal and 
may add to the quality of the balancing. The quality of the balancing may be improved 
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because parliament can verify whether or not the authority who submitted the bill39 has 
ignored any relevant circumstances. Thus, the risk may be diminished that a particular 
circumstance that should be taken into account in the balancing process is ignored. Further, 
the quality of the balancing may be improved, because if the authority that submits the bill 
is urged to explain which circumstances it has taken into consideration, parliament can 
verify whether each of the circumstances adduced is actually present and whether each of 
the circumstances has indeed the impact that the authority claims it has.
2.2.6.5. The interaction between the method of the catalogue of circumstances and 
the priority principles of transition
Hence, in my opinion, the method of the catalogue of circumstances is an appropriate 
method for the legislator to approach the concept of legitimate expectations in the field of 
transitional law. In section 2.2.5, I argued that the legislator should apply the priority prin-
ciples of transitional law, viz. the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and 
the principle of non-retroactivity. I would like to emphasize that these two conclusions are 
neither contradictory nor inconsistent. To the contrary, they complement each other. 
First of all, the priority principles of transitional law gain more significance through 
the catalogue of circumstances. Due to the catalogue of circumstances, it is clear which 
circumstances the legislator should take into account when the principles of priority are 
applied. Secondly, there is an interaction. As far as retroactivity is concerned, the point of 
departure in a concrete case of transitional law-making is that granting retroactive effect 
would lead to a breach of legitimate expectations. The method of the catalogue of circum-
stances is then used to scrutinize whether or not the circumstances of the legislative case 
nevertheless justify the conclusion that the expectations at hand have less weight than the 
‘counter-interests’. Further, conversely, as far as immediate effect without grandfathering is 
concerned, the point of departure in a concrete case of transitional law-making is that 
immediate effect without grandfathering does not lead to a breach of legitimate expecta-
tions. The method of the catalogue of circumstances is then used to scrutinize whether the 
circumstances of the legislative case nevertheless justify the conclusion that the expecta-
tions should be honoured by providing for grandfathering. 
2.2.7. The catalogue of circumstances for making of transition law
2.2.7.1. The contents of the catalogue of circumstances
In the previous section, I advocated the method of the catalogue of circumstances to 
approach the concept of legitimate expectations, which concept is relevant for the applica-
tion of the priority principles of transitional law. This plea for the method of the catalogue 
of circumstances (in combination with the priority principles of transitional law) was based 
on a theoretical investigation of ways to deal with the concept of legitimate expectations. 
The question, however, arises whether the method can actually be applied in practice. Is it 
possible to draft a catalogue of circumstances that the legislator should take into account in 
balancing the colliding interests when making transitional law? And if so, which circum-
stances should be included in the catalogue of circumstances, and what is the impact of 
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To answer these questions I scrutinized various legal sources. These sources are actual transi-
tional law enacted by the Netherlands legislator and the related legislative history (such as 
Explanatory Notes to the bill, parliamentary advisory opinions on draft legislation by the 
Netherlands Council of State, and reports of the parliamentary debate), case law (Nether-
lands case law, case law of the European Court of Justice and case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights) and the literature (Netherlands as well as foreign). I systematically anal-
ysed these legal sources on the issue of which circumstances were considered relevant for 
the balancing to be made in the transitional law at hand (or – with respect to case law – for 
the judgment by the court with respect to the transitional law enacted). For convenience of 
comparison, I reasoned from a balancing of two interests: on the one hand – contra retroac-
tivity and retrospectivity – the principle of legal certainty and, on the other hand, the inter-
ests that may be served by retroactivity or retrospectivity (‘counter-interests’). Thus, for each 
circumstance that appeared to be relevant the relevance was assessed: does the circum-
stance positively or negatively influence the weight of the principle of legal certainty or of 
the counter-interest? 
Based on this investigation and analysis I conclude that the first question can be 
answered in the affirmative: yes, it is possible to draft a catalogue of circumstances for 
 making of transition law. The analysis shows that certain circumstances continuously play a 
role in discussions and reasoning with respect to making of transition law in the field of 
taxation. These circumstances should be included in the catalogue of circumstances for 
making of transition law. Also the second question (which circumstances?, and what is the 
impact of each of them?) can be answered on the basis of the research. I present the results 
in the table below.
Table 2-1. 
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In this contribution, it is not possible to discuss this table and each of the mentioned cir-
cumstances in detail.40 This would not only take too much room it is also not necessary for 
the purpose of this contribution. After all, the main goal of this contribution is to show that 
the method of the catalogue of circumstances is a suitable method, in combination with the 
priority principles of transitional law, for making of transition law.
It is nonetheless helpful to exemplify the table. Therefore, I briefly discuss two circum-
stances in the next section. These circumstances are (i) ‘taxpayers’ behaviour: tax avoidance’, 
and (ii) ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’, in particular in the situa-
tion of tax avoidance.
2.2.7.2. Two circumstances discussed
One of the circumstances that should be taken into account by the legislator when making 
transitional law is the circumstance that ‘tax avoidance’ occurs under the existing legisla-
tion. The table indicates that this circumstance, on the one hand, has a negative effect on the 
weight of the principle of legal certainty and, on the other hand, a positive effect on the 
weight of the counter interests. The table indicates that it is difficult to sharply define the 
40.	 In	my	PhD.-dissertation	I	discussed	each	circumstance	in	more	detail	in	about	150	pages	in	total.
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concept of ‘tax avoidance’. I note that in any case the concept includes ‘tax abuse’, but I will 
not expand further on this conceptual issue. I focus on the above-mentioned effects.
The negative effect on the weight of the principle of legal certainty, on the one hand, 
and the positive effect on the weight of the counter interests, on the other hand, thus 
implies that when ‘tax avoidance’ is present, this lowers the relative weight of the principle 
of legal certainty. In relation to the principles of transitional law this means that if 
anti-avoidance legislation is introduced (i) there is less reason to provide for grandfathering 
and (ii) there is more reason to grant retroactive effect (for example, till the moment of an 
announcement by the government that it will propose introducing anti-avoidance legisla-
tion; the technique of ‘legislating by press release’).
However, the above does not yet provide arguments for the above-mentioned effects. 
In my opinion, these effects have a solid theoretical basis. With respect to the principle of 
legal certainty, it should be noted that taxpayers who seek out the boundaries of the law 
and who exploit loopholes can reasonably expect that eventually the legislator will target 
the tax avoidance concerned. Moreover, the question can be raised whether expectations 
based on a loophole can fairly be regarded as ‘reasonable’, let alone ‘legitimate’. With 
respect to the ‘counter interests’, it should be noted that there are interests that are espe-
cially served in case the anti-avoidance rule has a broad reach. First, as the purpose of the 
existing tax rules is undermined by the avoidance of these rules, a broad reach of the 
anti-avoidance rule serves that purpose. Secondly, a broad reach could enhance equality of 
taxpayers.41 After all, taxpayers who are in fact in a comparable economic position could 
have a different tax burden depending on whether or not the taxpayer exploits the loophole 
in the legislation. Further, from a more extensive point of view on the principle of equality, 
the principle of equality is at stake, because tax avoidance comes at the expense of the other 
taxpayers.
Analysis of various legal sources shows that it is generally accepted that the existence 
of tax avoidance, or at least of tax abuse, has a negative impact on the relative weight of the 
principle of legal certainty. In the Netherlands, the legislative practice indicates that in the 
case of anti-abuse legislation the legislator usually does not provide for grandfathering and 
that it sometimes provides for retroactive effect. Not only in Netherlands legislative prac-
tice, but also in the legislative practice of other countries the view is apparently that retroac-
tivity may be justified in the case of tax avoidance.42 Furthermore, also in the academic liter-
ature it is recognized that retroactivity could be appropriate in the case of abuse or 
improper use of legislation.43 Moreover, support can be found in judgments of international 
courts. Several decisions of the ECtHR44 suggest that this court will not consider retroactivity 
of tax legislation contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR in case the legislation at stake 
targets tax avoidance.45 Furthermore, the Gemeente Leusden / Holin Groep (C-487/01 and 
C-7/02) case of the ECJ is interesting. That case did not concern retroactivity but retrospec-
tivity of a Netherlands anti-abuse measure in the field of VAT. The ECJ considered (paragraph 
79): ‘as regards tax avoidance, although, under the law of a Member State, a taxpayer cannot 
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out constituting an abuse, has allowed him to pay less tax, the repeal of legislation from 
which a person (…) has derived an advantage cannot, as such, breach a legitimate expecta-
tion based on Community law.’
The second circumstance that I would like discuss for the purpose of illustration is 
the circumstance ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’. This circum-
stance is amongst other ones relevant in the situation of tax avoidance. Notwithstanding 
the above, it is important that the legislator does react with sufficient speed to tax avoid-
ance. In case the legislator neglects to combat a certain form of tax avoidance that it has 
known about for a long time, this has an impact on the balancing of interests with respect 
to retroactivity or retrospectivity. If the legislator infringes its ‘duty of care’ to react with 
sufficient speed, this has a positive impact on the relative weight of the principle of legal 
certainty. This can be substantiated as follows. 
As mentioned above, if taxpayers seek out the boundaries of the law and exploit 
loopholes, they can reasonably expect that the legislator will target the tax avoidance 
involved. However, if the legislator does not respond by introducing legislation that targets 
the tax avoidance, one may argue that the weight of the principle of legal certainty increases 
again. The idea is that taxpayers may start to wonder whether or not the loophole concerned 
is indeed a loophole, as the legislator has not reacted. 
A second element is that in case the legislator neglects to react with sufficient speed, 
it is harder to maintain that the interest that is served by retroactivity is really very weighty. 
After all, one could reason that the legislator definitely would have responded earlier if the 
interest indeed had been very weighty. A slow legislator, therefore, suggests a lack of 
urgency. An example is the Stichting Goed Wonen II judgment of the ECJ (C-376/02), concern-
ing a case in which the instrument of ‘legislation by press release’ (retroactive effect until 
the moment of the earlier announcement by press release) was used by the Netherlands 
government when introducing an anti-abuse rule. Advocate General Tizzano stated that ‘the 
retroactive effect of the amending law was not ‘necessary’ to achieve the aim, stated by the 
Netherlands Government, of combating an ‘unintended use’ of the tax legislation (…). 
Indeed, it is difficult to argue that, in a situation such as the present one, the aim of putting 
a stop to actions which were in themselves lawful and had been continuing for some years 
could be usefully pursued only by means of a law having retroactive effect. Indeed, given 
that in this case there was no sudden discovery of an unforeseen and unforeseeable situa-
tion, a law prohibiting ‘undesirable’ devices for the future alone would have made it possi-
ble to put a stop to them, whilst causing only slight economic damage (being limited in 
time and in any event linked to behaviour that had long been tolerated) and without seri-
ously undermining the principle of legal certainty.’ I note that it is true that the ECJ did not 
follow the final conclusion of the Advocate General, but this does not mean that the ECJ 
rejected Tizzano’s reasoning. After all, when the ECJ ruled that the ‘necessary’-requirement 
may have been met, it did not refer to the argument of combating the unintended use, but 
held that the aim to prevent an announcement effect might justify the retroactive effect in 
question.
The above shows why the table indicates that the circumstances ‘behaviour of the 
government: legislature’s duty of care’ is a ‘counter circumstance’ if that duty of care is 
infringed. The circumstance ‘behaviour of the government: legislature’s duty of care’ is 
mainly a correction to the impact of another circumstance. Applied to the above: the cir-
cumstance ‘tax avoidance’ has a negative impact on the relative weight of the principle of 
legal certainty, but the circumstance that the legislator infringed his duty of care calls for a 
correction to that impact, making the impact at least less negative. It is, however, not possi-
ble to state in general what the final impact of both circumstances is. In a concrete case both 
circumstances should be balanced.
A fine example of this balancing in a concrete case can be found in the Netherlands 
legislative practice regarding a bill that was submitted to target a particular type of tax 
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avoidance. In the Explanatory Memorandum the State Secretary of Finance explained why 
the bill provided for grandfathering (limiting the retrospectivity) although the bill con-
cerned was an anti-abuse rule: ‘With respect to the application field of a new rule, in general 
a new rule has immediate effect, in especial in case the new rule has an anti-abuse character. 
(…) On the other hand, it cannot be denied that a pure immediate effect would have unde-
sirable consequences in the case at hand. (…) Therefore, it is proposed to provide for grand-
fathering to a certain extent (…). The reason is that (…) the legislator has neglected to pro-
vide for a proper regulation for years.’46
2.2.8. Conclusion
In the introduction I raised the question how the tax legislator should deal with the various 
colliding interests when making transitional law. In this contribution, I advocate a frame-
work for the tax legislator, based on a principle-based approach. This framework consists of 
two parts. 
The first part concerns the principles of transitional law. These principles are the 
principle of immediate effect without grandfathering and the principle of non-retroactivity. 
These principles are generally accepted. In this contribution, I argued that these principles 
should be conceptualized as ‘priority principles’. With respect to the theoretical foundation 
of these principles, I showed that they can be regarded as the result of the abstract balanc-
ing of the three main principles (or interests) involved when making transitional law. These 
are the principle of legal certainty, the principle of equality and ‘the objective of the law’. 
From this perspective, the transitional law principle of non-retroactivity is the result of the 
balancing in the sense the principle of legal certainty prevails and has priority over any 
other interests. As to the principle of immediate effect without grandfathering, the objec-
tive of the law and the principle of equality – which provide arguments against grandfather-
ing – outweigh the principle of legal certainty – which advocates grandfathering. 
The second part of the framework consists of the method of the catalogue of circum-
stances. In a concrete legislative case there may be reasons to deviate from the principles of 
transitional law. In that respect the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ is important. On the 
one hand, if no legitimate expectations are infringed, retroactivity may permissible. On the 
other hand, if the immediate effect (retrospectivity) were to infringe legitimate expecta-
tions, the legislator should provide for grandfathering. The question is, however, when 
expectations can be considered ‘legitimate’. It is argued that several steps could be distin-
guished. The first step – from subjective expectations to reasonable expectations – concerns 
a process of filtering by objectification of the expectations. This implies that the view of a 
reasonable person is taken. The second step concerns a balancing of the expectations with 
the interests that would be infringed if the expectations were to be honoured. Although 
these steps provide something to hold on, in the end the question cannot be answered in 
abstracto, but depends on the circumstances of the case. I argued that the method of the 
catalogue of circumstances is helpful in this respect. Such a catalogue consists of the cir-
cumstances which the legislator should take into account when balancing the colliding 
interests (as far as the circumstances are present in the legislative case at hand). This method 
not only provides the legislator a foothold for balancing, it may also contribute to the trans-
parency and quality of the balancing during the legislative process. Finally, I showed that 
the method of catalogue of circumstances is not a mere theoretical idea. Based on an inves-
tigation and analysis of various legal sources, I showed that it is actually possible to draft a 
catalogue of circumstances that the legislator should take into account in balancing the 
colliding interests when making transitional law.
46.	 Kamerstukken	II	(Parliamentary	Proceedings	of	the	House	of	Representatives)	2004/05,	30	117,	no.	3,	at	pp.	3	en	8.
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Lastly, I note the following with respect to the normative and empirical support for the 
framework that I advocate. The combination of the priority principles of transitional law, on 
the one hand, and the method of the catalogue of circumstances, on the other hand, is not 
directly traceable in parliamentary proceedings, case law and the literature.47 However, this 
combination does find strongly support in these sources. In any of these sources it becomes 
apparent, explicitly or implicitly, (a) that immediate effect without grandfathering and 
non-retroactivity are considered the starting points for making of transition law, (b) that 
‘legitimate expectations’ do function as a correction mechanism with regard to these points 
of departure and (c) that certain circumstances can be pointed out that should be taken 
into account when balancing the colliding interests when making transitional law. Hence, 
the framework that I advocate is not only normative but also descriptive.
47.	 Note,	however,	that	my	approach	has	in	its	outline	many	similarities	with	the	approach	of	Popelier,	supra	note	32.
